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Kenneth A. Froot 
In recent years, the magnitude of catastrophic property-casualty disaster risks 
has become a major topic of  debate. The insurance industry now  regularly 
discusses potential U.S. earthquake or hurricane losses of $50-$100 billion, a 
magnitude of  loss that was unthinkable ten years ago. The disasters of Hurri- 
cane Andrew and the Northridge Earthquake alone totaled over $45 billion in 
1997 dollars, with the insured component running to almost $30 billion. This 
compares with cumulative insured losses from natural catastrophes in the de- 
cade prior to those events (roughly 1980-92)  of  only about $25 billion (ac- 
cording to data from Property Claims Services). 
These enormous increases in potential losses are likely to be permanent and 
even to increase over time. During the period 1970-90,  the population of the 
Southeast Atlantic coastal counties increased by nearly 75 percent, a rate al- 
most four times that of the nation as a whole. Annual growth rates in popula- 
tion per square mile in California and Florida have been two or three times the 
national average for the last three decades (Lewis and Murdock, chap. 2 in this 
volume). Indeed, analysis by Guy Carpenter and Co. suggests that, because of 
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growth in hazard-prone areas since 1950, real-dollar damages of a given-size 
natural event have been doubling every fourteen years. 
With prospective event losses that can easily exceed $50 billion, it would 
appear that the insurance industry is not ready for a major event. The capital- 
ization of the bearers of catastrophe risk is a major problem. Estimates (from 
the A.  M. Best Co. as of 30 September 1996) of total capital and surplus of 
U.S. insurers run to about $239 billion. While a large natural disaster would 
not bankrupt the entire industry, this capital and surplus apply to all risks 
(property-casualty, liability, worker’s  compensation, etc.), not just  catastro- 
phes. A large event could, therefore, place firms’ capital under severe stress, 
potentially jeopardizing the rewards of both policyholders and investors. 
Traditionally, the insurance industry has avoided these financial stresses by 
pooling its exposures for large events. This occurs through reinsurance treaties 
with separately capitalized reinsurers. Insurers can pass along the risks of low- 
probability, high-cost events to these reinsurers, who accomplish the pooling. 
The pass-through is, however, only partial. Very  little of  the reinsurance in 
place provides protection against industrywide losses for catastrophic (cat) 
events greater than $5 billion. That is, for a $50 billion cat event, the over- 
whelming majority of the last $45 billion of losses (after the first $5 billion) is 
not covered by reinsurance. In a narrow sense, this is not surprising, given the 
relatively small capital and surplus of  the reinsurance industry ($26.7 billion 
for U.S. reinsurers, $6.5 billion for Bermudan reinsurers, $7.0 billion for Ger- 
man reinsurers, and $16.8 billion for others) (Guy Carpenter 1997). Thus, at 
present levels of capital, the worldwide reinsurance industry is not capable of 
funding large-event risks in the United States, let alone the rest of the world. 
The paucity of reinsurance protection at high layers of exposure can be ob- 
served directly from reinsurance-buying patterns. To do this, I assembled data 
on property-casualty contracts brokered by Guy Carpenter. These data cover a 
large fraction of all catastrophe-reinsurance  purchases by U.S.  insurers.’ From 
them, it is possible to gain a sense of the paucity of reinsurance coverage at 
high levels of  losses. Figure 1  shows the relation in these data between the 
fraction of  pooled insurer exposure covered by  reinsurance and the size of 
industrywide events2 
1. Catastrophe-reinsurance contracts oblige the writer to pay the cedent insurer for its insurance 
losses associated with a natural hazard. The contracts are typically in an “excess-of-loss” form. 
This means that the writer is obliged to pay up to a fixed-limit amount for all losses in excess of a 
given deductible (“retention”). To see how such contracts work, consider an insurer that purchases 
a layer of reinsurance covering $100 million in cat losses in excess of $200 million. These terms 
imply that, if the insurer’s losses from a single catastrophic event during the contract year exceed 
$200 million retention, the layer is triggered. The reinsurer pays the insurer the amount of any 
losses in excess of $200 million, with the loss capped at a limit of  $100 million. By purchasing 
this contract, the insurer cedes its exposure to single-event catastrophe losses in the $200-$300 
million range. In return for assuming this exposure, the reinsurer receives a premium payment. If 
the insurer wishes to cede a broader band of exposure, it could purchase additional layers-$100 
million in excess of  $300 million, $100 million in excess of $400 million, and so on. 
2. The procedure for attaching individual reinsurance-contract layers to industry losses is de- 
scribed in Froot and O’Connell (chap. 5 in this volume). 3  Introduction 
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Fig. 1  Percentage of exposure that insurance companies reinsure (by various 
event sizes) 
Note:  Event  losses are  given in  1994 dollars  and  are adjusted  for changes  in  demographics 
and GNP. 
There are two important points to be made from figure 1. First, reinsurance 
coverage as a fraction of exposure declines markedly with the size of the event, 
falling to a level of less than 30 percent for events of only about $5 billi~n.~ 
Clearly, only a small fraction of large-event exposures is covered, and, remark- 
ably, this figure overstates that fraction. That is because the only insurers in- 
cluded in the data are those that actually purchase rein~urance.~  The implica- 
tion is that insurance companies overwhelmingly retain, rather than share, their 
large-event risks. 
This point must be expanded in one important respect. Many exposures 
faced by the corporate and household sectors are self-retained and never even 
reach insurers in thejrst  place. Corporations, for example, tend to self-insure, 
particularly  against  large  losses-even  while  purchasing  insurance  against 
small losses. One study documents that insurance coverage is extremely lim- 
ited for corporate cat losses of  between $10 and $500 million (for a single 
corporation) and virtually nonexistent for losses above $500 million (Doherty 
and Smith 1993). This suggests that the vast majority of primitive cat risk in 
the economy is being retained. The implication is that the problem of inade- 
quate risk sharing-and  the failure of the reinsurance sector to help accom- 
plish it-is  on a far larger scale than can be directly indicated by figure l.5 
3. Indeed, the figure shows that 30 percent is an improvement over the past. In 1970, coverage 
of similar event sizes was less than 20 percent. 
4. For firms that did buy reinsurance and are in the database, I observe the entire reinsurance 
program. 
5. Of course, some types of risk are subject to asymmetrical information or manipulation, and 
the resulting adverse selection or moral hazard makes sharing them inherently problematic. 1 dis- 4  Kenneth A. Froot 
There is a second, more subtle point to be taken from figure 1. It is apparent 
that, after a large event, like Hurricane Andrew in 1992, retentions (or “deduct- 
ibles”) tend to increase. After an event, the total amount of coverage does not 
rise (indeed, it appears to fall somewhat). Most of the action is that a typical 
firm’s window of coverage shifts toward higher layers of protection. In other 
words, coverage for large events apparently increases only at the expense of 
coverage for small events. I return to this point in the discussion below. 
It is striking that so little reinsurance is in place for large-event losses. After 
all, it is large events whose risks need most to be shared. This paucity of risk 
sharing is costly for two reasons. First, poor risk sharing means that individuals 
bear higher portfolio risks. With higher portfolio risk, hurdle rates for new 
investments are higher, and, therefore, investment spending is lower, than if 
risk sharing were perfect. 
There is a second cost that makes hurdle rates higher and investment lower. 
This comes from ex post burden sharing. Ex post burden sharing occurs when 
those who bear risk try to get someone else to pay their losses. This behavior 
is costly because it creates bad incentives. If someone else will pay, then risk- 
increasing investments are subsidized, while risk-reducing investments, such 
as mitigation,  are taxed. For  example, homeowners  overbuild on  exposed 
coastline because of subsidized insurance rates or because they expect to be 
bailed out by a government program; insurers are tempted to take too much 
risk relative to their capital, thereby shifting part of the cost of disasters onto 
other insurers, state agencies, and insurance customers; and some households 
and companies decline to purchase sufficient insurance, under the assumption 
that they will receive de facto protection. Bad incentives increase the aggregate 
level of risk. They also further worsen its distribution, as those with the greatest 
cat risks have the greatest marginal incentive to take more on. 
It is not my goal here to gauge the magnitude of these costs. But both these 
mechanisms raise costs of capital and reduce economic growth. While the link 
between lower capital costs and higher growth rates is not well established, it 
is worth noting that lowering capital costs by enough to spur even a single 
basis point of additional growth is worth $700 million per year in a $7 trillion 
economy such as that of the United States. 
The discussion below takes as its central premise the argument that the sys- 
tem of redistributing large catastrophe risks has not spread risks into and be- 
yond insurer balance sheets and out evenly across investors. The discussion 
also takes as given that there are large costs associated with an equilibrium in 
which risk sharing is inefficient. I then go on to ask whether the current frame- 
work for managing cat risk is functioning as well as is possible. What barriers 
(if any) prevent higher-layer risks from being spread and/or mitigated? Are the 
capital markets likely to solve the problem? 
_____ 
cuss this issue below. For now, however, it is sufficient to note that catastrophe events-so-called 
acts of God-are  basically exogenous to mankind. These risks (as  opposed to, say, liability risks) 
are, therefore, relatively free from asymmetrical information and moral hazard. 5  Introduction 
These are the issues that motivate this volume and the papers in it. The ob- 
jective of the volume is to facilitate a better understanding of the issues and to 
serve as a starting point for serious discussion among practitioners, academics, 
and policymakers about the basic problems. 
In what follows, I enumerate eight different explanations for barriers to bet- 
ter risk sharing. These explanations serve as ways of introducing the ideas of 
each chapter and set of panelist comments. Naturally, one’s view of the solution 
to the problem of inadequate catastrophic risk sharing depends on the assumed 
cause. The introduction then turns to solutions that have been suggested, many 
during the conference itself, with a focus on the role of the capital markets and 
alternative means of redistributing cat risk. 
Explanations for the Paucity of Catastrophe Risk Sharing 
Explanation 1 :  Prices of Catastrophe Reinsurance Are High 
because of Insufficient Reinsurance Capital 
This explanation relies on the premise that prices are high. Thus, before 
evaluating  the  sufficiency  of  reinsurance  capital,  we  must  first  examine 
whether reinsurance prices are high relative to some natural benchmark. A 
comparison of actual prices with a benchmark that somehow represents fair 
prices is a useful indicator. For the sake of argument, I assume that fair prices 
are those that would prevail if the system for redistributing cat risk were perfect 
and frictionless. In such a system, catastrophe-risk prices would be determined 
by  investors. This makes sense because it is investors who, in one form or 
another, must ultimately provide catastrophic risk-bearing  capacity. 
As is generally argued by both practitioners and financial economists, inves- 
tors require relatively low average returns for bearing risk exposures that pro- 
vide large diversification benefits. Take, for example, investments that are a 
small part of total wealth and that are uncorrelated with the returns on other 
forms of  wealth (such as stocks and bonds). Such investments improve the 
reward-to-risk ratio of investor wealth as long as their average returns exceed 
the return on risk-free investments like U.S. Treasury bills. This suggests that 
the (relatively low) short-term U.S. Treasury rate is the threshold required re- 
turn for a small, uncorrelated investment. 
Historical data suggest that catastrophe risk is one such investment since 
returns from bearing cat risk through reinsurance contracts are uncorrelated 
with all other major investor asset classes6 If this is true, then, with wide risk 
distribution, the fair catastrophe premium on a reinsurance contract is just the 
actuarial contract loss. In other words, the contract premium should equal actu- 
arial insurer losses covered by  the reinsurance contract. Of  course, actuarial 
6. See Froot et al. (1995), which presents data showing that recent returns from bearing catastro- 
phe risk are uncorrelated with other major financial asset classes, such as U.S. and foreign stocks 
and bonds as well as currencies. 6  Kenneth A. Froot 
losses are not known with certainty. One can only estimate actuarial losses. 
Nevertheless, as long as the estimate of expected loss is unbiased and the un- 
certainty in actuarial losses is itself uncorrelated with investor wealth, then the 
premium should on average equal estimated actuarial losses. 
To  those in the industry, it comes as no surprise that reinsurance premiums 
are today considerably  greater than estimates of actuarially expected losses 
covered by reinsurance. A good and very visible example is the recent purchase 
of  reinsurance by  the California Earthquake Authority (CEA) from National 
Indemnity, a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway. Under the structure of that con- 
tract, National Indemnity receives an annual premium that exceeds actuarially 
expected losses by 530 percent. To  see this, note that the average annual pre- 
mium for the four-year aggregate cover is 10.75 percent of the annual limit, 
whereas the likelihood that the reinsurance is triggered is 1.7 percent or (10.751 
1.7) - 1 = 530 percent (according to EQE International, a catastrophe-risk- 
modeling firm). In other words, Berkshire Hathaway has a 1.7 percent chance 
per year of losing the $1.05 billion it has put up; in return, it receives $113 
million per year in premiums. Indeed, under the contract specifications, Berk- 
shire Hathaway receives four years’ worth of premiums in the first two years. 
Since the $1.05 billion cover aggregates over the four-year period, Berkshire 
Hathaway is effectively putting up about $600 million in net exposure for a 
93.4 percent chance to make about $400 million in premi~m.~ 
The pricing of this contract is, in today’s market, not unusual. Historically, 
reinsurance-contract  premiums  have  exceeded  actuarial  contract  losses  by 
large amounts. Figure 2 shows a computation of the percentage excess of pre- 
miums over expected losses. While a multiple of five appears relatively high 
by the standards of the early 1980s, prices are on average nearly that high since 
Humcane Andrew. In many instances, the prices are greater than those shown 
in figure 2, which averages across both high and low reinsurance layers. In 
general, the  multiples  on  low-probability, higher layers (such  as the  CEA 
tranche) have been particularly high (see fig. 3),  the more so since Hurricane 
Andrew. 
Once reaction to the Berkshire Hathaway example and the numbers shown 
in figure 2 is healthy skepticism. The computations require one to measure 
actuarial value, which is not really possible. The actuarial values behind the 
figure are derived from the historical distribution of catastrophe losses.* And 
this historical distribution is likely to differ from what market participants con- 
sidered to be relevant at various times. Indeed, a portion of what appears to be 
a secular increase in prices in figure 2 may actually be attributable to increas- 
ingly large losses expected by the market. 
7. Based on a probability of 1.7 percent per year, the chance of no event over the four years is 
(98.3%)4  = 93.4%.  Data in this paragraph are from ZBNR Insurance Weekly (Dowling and Partners 
Securities) (vol. 3, no. 46) and from remarks by Richard Sandor. 
8. For a description of how these numbers are calculated, see Froot and O’Connell (chap. 5 in 
this volume). 1977  1979  1981  1983  7985 
Year 
1987  1989  1991  1993 
Fig. 2  Industry price per unit of ceded exposure 
8 
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Fig. 3  Relation of price to attachment probability (layer 10 is highest retention) 8  Kenneth A. Froot 
However, none of this skepticism changes the fact that, while the numbers 
in the figure seem high by  actuarial standards, they are not high by  the stan- 
dards of current market prices for catastrophe risk, at least as shown by  the 
National IndemnityKEA reinsurance layer. Indeed, Berkshire Hathaway share- 
holders appear to have rejoiced at having written the reinsurance: on the day 
the contract was announced, Berkshire’s stock market valuation rose by  over 
$400 million, or 1 percent, in excess of the broad stock market change. This 
suggests that shareholders saw the reinsurance contract (and those that might 
follow) as providing net present value. 
With these arguments about catastrophe-reinsurance prices in mind, it is 
worth exploring the reasons why prices might indeed be too high. (Below, I 
also consider explanations that assume that current prices are fair.) The specific 
explanation considered in this section is that prices are high because cata- 
strophic risk-taking capital is somehow limited. Even if such capital shortages 
are relatively temporary, they might exist for a number of structural reasons: it 
may be costly for existing reinsurers to raise additional funds in the capital 
markets; it may be hard to find investors and names who expect adequate re- 
wards for bearing catastrophic risks; it may  also be that it is costly for re- 
insurers to accumulate large amounts of collateral on their balance sheets. 
Shortages of  capital are an important rationale for Berkshire Hathaway’s 
strategy in reinsurance. In his 1996 letter to shareholders in Berkshire Hatha- 
way’s annual report, Warren Buffett observes, “Our. . .  competitive gdvantage 
[in writing ‘supercat’ risks] is that we can provide dollar coverages of a size 
neither matched nor approached elsewhere in the industry. Insurers looking for 
huge covers know that a single call to Berkshire will produce a firm and imme- 
diate offering.” Given that easy access by new and existing reinsurers to addi- 
tional capital would remove this competitive advantage, it seems clear that 
Buffet believes in-and  profits from-capital  shortages. 
Indeed, there is a perception that the shortage may become even worse once 
reinsurer capital is depleted by  a large event. Again in Berkshire Hathaway’s 
1996 annual report, Buffett writes, “After a mega-catastrophe, insurers might 
well find it difficult to obtain reinsurance even though their need for coverage 
would then be particularly great. At such a time . . . it will naturally be [Berk- 
shire’s] long-standing clients that have first call on it. That business reality has 
made major insurers and reinsurers throughout the world realize the desirabil- 
ity of doing business with us. Indeed, we are currently getting sizable ‘stand- 
by’ fees from reinsurers that are simply nailing down their ability to get cover- 
age from us should the market tighten.” Buffett’s entire discussion of “super- 
cat” risks emphasizes the value to Berkshire’s shareholders of  the company’s 
substantial financial capacity. In a world of no capital shortages, large capital 
capacity is nothing to write home about. 
Are there more concrete facts to suggest that capital shortages are behind 
high prices? There are some. A second important feature of  figure 2 is that 
prices appear to rise in the aftermath of major catastrophic events and then fall 9  Introduction 
Table 1  Event Study of Hurricane Andrew 
A. Southeast Exposure  B. Humcane Exposure 
Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
5 most-exposed insurers  ,707  ,415  -  .02  1  .918  ,583  -.082 
5 least-exposed insurers  .OOO  .335  -.013  ,561  ,336  -  ,047 
Source: Froot and O’Connell (chap. 5 in this volume). 
Note:  Comparison of price responses in the year after Humcane Andrew, for different insurers. Panel A 
contrasts insurers that have high and low exposure to the Southeast (as measured by market share). Panel 
B contrasts insurers that have high and low exposure to hurricanes. The table shows the mean exposure 
and the mean price change of the five most extreme contracts in each case. The mean price change for the 
insurers with lesser exposure to the Southeast is calculated using all fourteen of the insurers that have zero 
market share in that region. 
afterward. This can be seen most clearly in the period around Hurricane An- 
drew (1992). Prices rose  substantially in  1993 and have consistently fallen 
since. While the figure does not include 1995 and 1996 price data, preliminary 
estimates suggest that prices have fallen by approximately 27 percent during 
that time? 
It is perhaps not surprising that the price of reinsurance  increases in the 
aftermath of an event since event losses are likely to raise the demand for 
insurance and reinsurance. Of course, one reason for an increase in demand is 
that capital and surplus are depleted and in short supply at the insurer level.1° 
In a world of perfect markets, this depletion would, by  itself, have no effect 
on reinsurance demand. Insurance companies would simply enter the capital 
markets, raising equity and even debt as needed, in order to put their capital 
back to original levels. Indeed, given the increase in consumer demand for 
insurance in the aftermath of a catastrophe, one might expect insurance compa- 
nies to raise considerable amounts of capital. Thus, one might argue that the 
increase in reinsurance prices is prima facie evidence that there are capital 
shortages somewhere in the system. 
However, the behavior of  prices alone cannot be decisive for whether the 
supply of reinsurance capital is relatively restricted after events. The combina- 
tion of prices and quantities, on the other hand, is more decisive. Indeed, the 
cyclic price patterns turn out to be mirrored by synchronized declines in the 
“quantity” of reinsurance purchased. 
Table 1 provides a kind of event study to demonstrate this. The table shows 
both price and quantity responses in reinsurance purchased  during the year 
following Hurricane Andrew. (Prices and quantity are measured using the same 
9. Paragon produces a catastrophe-price index that, since peaking in late  1994 at 2.47 (and 
beginning on  1 January 1984 at  1.00).  shows the following prices: 2.32 on 1 January 1995; 2.16 
on 1 July 1995; 2.14 on 1 January 1996; and 2.06 on 1 July 1996. 
10. For a study of demand and supply issues in pricing, see Gron (chap. 1 in this volume). 10  Kenneth A. Froot 
actuarially expected annual reinsurance benefits that lie behind figs. 1 and 2 
above.) It is evident that, in the aftermath of large events like Humcane An- 
drew, reinsurance purchases fall. (In practice, this occurs primarily through an 
increase in insurer retentions.) Indeed, the table shows that the quantity pur- 
chased fell by  more-and  prices rose by  more-for  those insurers that had 
greater exposure to the southeastern United States and to hurricanes wherever 
they occur. 
The combination of  a postevent increase in price and decrease in quantity 
cannot be explained by an increase in demand. High demand would be associ- 
ated with high prices and high quantities sold, much as if one were to observe 
transaction prices and quantities of electric generators sold during a blackout. 
What is going on in the reinsurance market is different: in the aftermath of 
events, there is less provision of reinsurance capacity even though prices are 
higher. This can be explained only by a temporary shift backward in the supply 
of capital. 
In some sense, it should also not be surprising that the supply of cat-risk- 
bearing capital is restricted immediately following an event: after all, large- 
event losses deplete reinsurers’ capital and surplus going forward. For at least 
a time, however, the high prices and low quantities are consistent with a view 
that additional capital has trouble flowing into the reinsurance sector.“ 
The final point in this section is that there is a kind of irony in capital market 
shortages and paucity of reinsurance: much primitive cat risk could be reduced 
through investments in mitigation, investments that are inexpensive in an actu- 
arial sense. However, many of these investments are not made because they 
require individuals and corporations, who have scarce capital themselves, to 
raise (or deplete internal) capital. Thus, capital market shortages are in part 
responsible for the large and growing risk pool needing insurance and reinsur- 
ance. Without capital shortages, reinsurance  capacity would be greater, but 
there would also be fewer risks to reinsure in the first place (see Kleindorfer 
and Kunreuther, chap. 4  in this volume). 
Explanation 2: Prices of Catastrophe Reinsurance Are High 
because Reinsurers Have Market Power 
A number of observers have suggested that the evidence presented above on 
prices and quantities might be explained by  market power rather than by  a 
capital shortage per se. Under this explanation, prices rise, and quantities de- 
cline, not because reinsurance capital is impossible or costly to obtain, but 
because reinsurers have no incentive to increase their capital. By putting less 
money at risk, reinsurers keep prices high. James M. Stone (see chap.  11 in 
11. It  is common in the industry for reinsurers to require “paybacks” for event losses and to do 
so through higher premiums and retentions. Note that, to the extent that it explains the data, there 
is nothing in this practice to contradict explanation 1. However, an important question remains as 
to why this kind of  contracting prevails and what it tells us about reinsurance markets. For  one 
potential answer, see explanation 5 below. 11  Introduction 
this volume) has argued that market power among reinsurers may be one rea- 
son that, for catastrophe exposures, reinsurance is a much more attractive busi- 
ness than insurance. 
It is, of  course, very  hard to provide evidence that market power among 
reinsurers has increased secularly over time or cyclically in the aftermath of 
events. There is a general view that the reinsurance industry has been consol- 
idating over time. There has been a distinct drop, for example, in the number 
of Lloyd’s syndicates since the 1960s and 1970s. There has also been an in- 
crease over time in the capital and market share of large reinsurers. But neither 
of these facts is necessarily associated with increased market power in setting 
prices or restricting supply. For example, even when there were many more 
Lloyd‘s syndicates, catastrophic risk pricing was not typically determined by 
individual syndicates. 
Furthermore, even if consolidation has occurred in the industry, it need not 
be associated with greater market power. Consolidation may be a natural result 
of economies of scale in the reinsurance business. Information intensity is one 
possible source of scale economies. For example, there may be high fixed costs 
of  developing analytic capabilities and systems (see remarks by  Stewart C. 
Myers, chap. 11 in this volume). Once these systems are in place, optimal rein- 
surer size grows as the required investment in fixed-cost systems increases. 
Consolidation may  also be an efficient industry response to the costs of ob- 
taining reinsurer capital from outside markets. (Size may help here as well.) 
If, in the extreme case, outside capital was effectively unavailable, then consol- 
idation would follow from reinsurers’ desire to diversify exposures and reduce 
the probability of ruin. 
There may also be a kind of interplay between explanations 1 and 2-the 
insufficient capital and market power  stories. Figure 2 above suggests that 
prices have both increased secularly and undergone cyclic fluctuations associ- 
ated with cat events. One would be hard-pressed to explain the secular price 
increase with the insufficient capital story. For example, entry of capital into 
the Bermudan reinsurers, beginning in 1993 with Mid-Ocean Ltd., suggests 
that the barriers to capital entry are not overwhelming, at least not over time 
periods of  more than a few years. The insufficient capital story by  itself is 
therefore likely to be better at explaining cyclic fluctuations in prices. How- 
ever, to the extent that insufficient capital also drives consolidation, it may 
contribute to market power, thereby indirectly driving prices up on a secular 
basis. 
Explanation 3: Prices of Catastrophe Reinsurance Are High 
because the Corporate Form for Reinsurance Is Inefficient 
Under this explanation, the corporate organizational form of reinsurers is 
costly. Observers of corporate governance often point out that there are costs 
associated with discretion given to managers to run a business. In principal, 
managers could act in ways not in the shareholders’ interests. It may be difficult 12  Kenneth A. Froot 
for shareholders both to identify this behavior and to discipline it. Even if most 
managers are benevolent, the prospect that a bad manager might use his agency 
relation against shareholders reduces  stock prices and drives up the cost of 
capital. 
This generic corporate-finance argument of “agency costs” has application 
in a number of arenas. First, it clearly can be applied to insurers and reinsurers. 
Many of the details of the reinsurance business and the specific contracts are 
not transparent  to arm’s-length capital providers. And, given the occasional 
big-loss nature of reinsurance,  it takes many years to evaluate management 
efficacy and business profitability. In the reinsurance business, bad managers 
may have an unusually large incentive to take the money and run. 
How costly is it to delegate discretion to managers? In the case of  some 
businesses, it is possible get a partial answer. Closed-end funds are one such 
business. Closed-end funds invest in publicly traded securities and then sell 
stakes in their portfolio to shareholders, much like mutual funds do. The differ- 
ence is that mutual funds are “open-ended”; shareholders can sell their shares 
back to the fund at a price dictated by the net asset value of  the portfolio. 
Closed-end funds do not automatically buy and sell their shares; a shareholder 
wishing to sell must find another investor. And, like the price of most traded 
stocks, the price of  the closed-end-fund shares must find its own value in the 
marketplace in accord with supply and demand. 
There is a puzzle associated with closed-end-fund shares: their prices are, 
on average, considerably below their net asset values. This cannot happen with 
open-ended-fund shares. Closed-end-share discounts average about 10-20  per- 
cent and are pervasive across funds. And it is often argued that agency costs 
account for these discounts. The story is that closed-end funds must pay  an 
average return in excess of what would be required for holding the underlying 
net assets. The reason is that shareholders can neither observe managers nor 
easily discipline  managers  should they turn out to misbehave. The lack of 
transparency and control means higher capital costs for running a fund, even 
for ostensibly good managers. 
This agency cost of capital may explain why the costs of reinsurance capi- 
tal-and,  by inference, reinsurance prices-are  high. This agency argument is 
buttressed by two regularities. The first is that managers of reinsurers regard 
their capital costs as “equity-like”-that  is, as requiring a return considerably 
above U.S. Treasury rates. Writing reinsurance at anywhere near actuarially 
fair premiums is viewed as being against shareholder interest. Yet, given that 
catastrophe risks are uncorrelated with those of other financial assets, share- 
holders’ required returns on cat risk should, as argued above, be low. Agency 
costs may be one factor forcing up required returns. The agency-cost explana- 
tion may, therefore, help us understand the view in the industry that, for many 
risks, there is too much capital and prices are too low. Indeed, some public 
reinsurers (such as Renaissance Re) are, as of this writing, in the process of 
repurchasing stock because the returns on writing reinsurance are so low. 
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efficient for the provision of  reinsurance. This is that, even without agency 
costs, there is evidence that shareholders expect reinsurer equity returns to be 
well above US.  Treasury rates. Evidence for this comes from the behavior of 
stock prices of public Bermudan reinsurers, such as Mid-Ocean, Renaissance 
Re, and Partner Re. These firms hold large property-catastrophe liabilities and 
generally hold assets in the form of short-term notes and bills. Neither their 
assets nor their liabilities are correlated with the stock market, yet their share 
prices comove strongly with the stock market. Specifically, a 10 percent in- 
crease in the level of the S&P 500 is associated with an increase in the average 
value of  these firms of about 6.5 percent.l*  All I know about the source of this 
comovement suggests that it does not emanate from the companies themselves. 
If the source of the comovement lies outside the companies, there is an inef- 
ficiency. Investors who see a stock with higher systematic risk of moving with 
the market expect the stock to deliver a higher, more equity-like return. As a 
result,  benevolent  managers  of  reinsurers  may  be  maximizing  shareholder 
value by requiring high hurdle rates for writing reinsurance. This suggests that 
equity-financed reinsurance may be inefficient even if agency costs are com- 
pletely unimportant. If  equity capital requires an equity-like return and rein- 
surer assets and liabilities contain no broad equity market risks, then equity is 
an expensive form of capital, pure and simple. And, if reinsurance is financed 
in an expensive manner, then reinsurance prices will be high. 
Offsetting these arguments are several facts. Roberto Mendoza of J. P.  Mor- 
gan has argued that Bermudan reinsurers, in particular, have a number of ad- 
vantages that reduce their costs of equity capital. First, Bermuda’s low corpo- 
rate income tax rate means that reinsurers do not suffer by using equity finance 
as opposed to debt since there are no interest tax deductions available in the 
first place. Second, Bermudan reinsurer balance sheets provide an opportunity 
to achieve tax-free compounding on invested assets (remarks by Roberto Men- 
doza, chap. 11 in this volume). Both these features tend to lower the cost of 
equity relative to what it would otherwise be. 
Third, rather than an agency “cost,” reinsurer managerial  discretion may 
provide an agency “benefit.” Smart managers may be able to cherry pick the 
better risk-writing opportunities, thereby raising share prices.I3  This set of fea- 
tures may imply that the typical corporate form of reinsurers, particularly those 
in Bermuda, is not so inefficient after all. Indeed, Mendoza (see chap. 11 in 
this volume) argues compellingly that these advantages make the Bermudan 
corporate form the most efficient reinsurance delivery mechanism. 
Explanation 4: Prices of Catastrophe Reinsurance Are High 
because Frictional Costs of Reinsurance Are High 
This explanation says that prices are high because, as financial instruments, 
reinsurance contracts are illiquid, have high transactions costs, brokerage, etc. 
12. Data on unadjusted stock betas from Bloomberg. 
13. Of course, the same argument is often made in defense of closed-end-fund managers. 14  Kenneth A. Froot 
These sources of friction imply that there are important costs in getting capital 
and reinsurance contracts together in a repository called a reinsuru 
There is abundant evidence that illiquid assets trade at significant discounts. 
For example, letter stock, as opposed to publicly traded stock, typically trades 
at discounts of 25 percent; on-the-run bonds trade at significantly higher pre- 
miums than less liquid off-the-run bonds; and so on. 
However, illiquidity of reinsurance contracts is not enough to drive prices 
up. In order to raise the cost of capital for reinsurers, reinsurers would them- 
selves need to be financed through illiquid placements. It can be argued that 
this may have been the case for Lloyd’s commitments from names; it is unlikely 
to be true for publicly traded reinsurers in Europe, the United  States, and 
Bermuda. 
Other frictions such as brokerage costs and servicing expenses can legiti- 
mately raise the cost of procuring reinsurance. However, these costs are not out 
of line with other financing charges. For example, in the National Indemnity 
transaction described above, annual brokerage fees were less than 1 percent of 
premium and 0.1 percent of limit. If the reinsurance had been issued as a capi- 
tal market instrument, as had been anticipated by some, these costs would have 
amounted to about 5 percent of the annual premium. Brokeragehnderwriting 
costs for both traditional and new capital market instruments can be expected 
over time to be competitive with those on other instruments. 
Another kind of frictional inefficiency is the means by which reinsurer port- 
folios are managed. Often today, and in many more cases in the past, reinsurers 
manage their portfolios by  aggregate limits rather than exposures. For  ex- 
ample, a reinsurer might decide that it will risk up to $100 million on Florida, 
but without specifying the probability of Florida losses on contracts written or 
the covariance of Florida losses with potential losses on North Carolina con- 
tracts. Removing such portfolio inefficiencies could have a substantial effect 
on the cost of risk transfer. 
However, the main point here is that the high level of  prices seems well 
above anything that can be explained by  brokerage and underwriting costs. 
Even if brokerage and underwriting expenses had come to a high of 10 percent 
of premium in the National Indemnity deal, complete elimination of these ex- 
penses would have driven down the multiple of premium relative to actuarially 
expected losses by about 0.6 from 5.3 to 4.7. Brokerage and underwriting ex- 
penses cannot explain observed price levels. 
Finally, it is hard to  argue that inefficient reinsurance portfolio practices 
keep prices high. The financial technology to improve efficiency exists and can 
be transferred fairly cheaply. Indeed, the fact that these inefficiencies prevail 
today seems to be evidence for the lack-of-competition view (explanation 2). 
Explanation 5: Prices of Catastrophe Reinsurance Are High because 
of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection at the Insurer Level 
There is often agreement, implicit or explicit, that reinsurers will charge 
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reinsurance is much like “finite” reinsurance. Finite reinsurance does not so 
much transfer risk from the cedent as it smooths the risk over time. The insurer 
uses the reinsurance more as a financing vehicle than as an instrument of risk 
transfer. During an event, the reinsurer makes funds available, expecting to be 
paid back later. In its purist form, the arrangement is just  event-contingent 
borro~ing.’~  Thus, to the extent that catastrophe reinsurance resembles finite 
reinsurance, it may be transferring even less risk than might appear on a year- 
by-year basis. Indeed, a prevalent view in the industry is that it is appropriate 
to have a “payback” to reinsurers after an event loss and that this drives reten- 
tion levels up. 
While this theme is frequently echoed among practitioners, it further begs 
the question of why there is so little risk transfer in the first place. Two mecha- 
nisms that would explain the use of  finite-risk-type contracts as well as high 
prices and low quantities would be moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Moral hazard says that an insurer’s behavior might change if  it were too 
easily allowed to transfer risk to reinsurers. Once the risks are transferred, in- 
surers have much less stake in prudent underwriting in the first place. Thus, it 
may be that the most efficient form of reinsurance is to allow very little risk 
transfer at all: only by forcing cat risk back on insurers (or by charging a very 
high price to assume risk) can reinsurers get insurers to expend the resources to 
monitor and mitigate exposures. A reinsurance intermediary who came along 
willing to charge a low price and take a substantial quantity of risk from an 
insurer might find that the insurer misbehaves. 
Adverse selection is a related problem. It says that insurers know more about 
their exposures and underwriting than do reinsurers. Those that are most eager 
to reinsure at any given price probably have private information that their expo- 
sures are worse than average. Similarly, those that are least eager to reinsure 
have private information that their exposures are better than average. The result 
is that, at any given price, reinsurers will do business with an adversely selected 
group of (the worst) insurer risks. Clearly, in the presence of adverse selection, 
the reinsurer needs to charge more to make up for the degree of adverse se- 
lection. 
This explanation has some interesting implications (see the discussion be- 
low). Unlike explanation 4,  it does have the ability to explain high levels of 
prices. However, it is not clear how it fits all the facts. For example, it is hard 
to see how the cyclic pattern of prices and quantities would emerge. Why, for 
example, are reinsurers womed that insurers have  a greater motive to forgo 
monitoring after cat events? Why might the information gap between insurers 
and  reinsurers be  greater in  the aftermath of  an  event? Is  there a pattern 
whereby insurers who transfer more risk are less profitable? Much needed is 
14. The contingent credit arranged for the Nationwide by J. P. Morgan has many of these fea- 
tures. 
15. In some circumstances, higher prices may actually exacerbate the problem, making it impos- 
sible for the market to function. For  a discussion of the implications of adverse selection on re- 
insurance contracts, see Cutler and Zeckhauser (chap. 6 in this volume). 16  Kenneth A. Froot 
further evidence along these lines that moral hazard and adverse selection are 
operative in the behavior of  prices and quantities. Personally, I am skeptical 
that these explanations can explain prices and quantities, particularly at higher 
layers. These layers should be relatively immune to moral hazard and adverse- 
selection considerations because the retentions  (deductible amounts) are so 
high.I6 
Explanation 6: Regulation Prevents Primary Insurers 
from Pricing Cat Properly 
This explanation  observes that a number of  major  high-catastrophic-risk 
states use regulatory barriers to keep insurance prices down. In some states, 
lines of business, and specific geographic areas, insurers must underwrite risk 
at prices well below those that are actuarially and financially profitable. This 
is perhaps not a surprising state of affairs when the insurance commissioners 
are publicly elected officials in twelve states, including California and Florida. 
Clearly, this situation cannot lead to a high level of prices in the reinsurance 
market. However, it can explain why there is so little reinsurance purchased 
even if prices are actuarially fair. The basic reasoning is that, if  insurers are 
unable to earn a profitable return by underwriting risk, they need to cut costs. 
One way of cutting costs is to avoid purchasing reinsurance. 
The mechanism here is analogous to that of rent control. Rent control is 
intended to make housing more affordable. It does so by reducing the return 
that owners receive from making improvements in the housing stock. Owners, 
therefore, make fewer improvements, and the quality of the housing stock falls. 
This goes on until equilibrium is reached: eventually, the low rents are matched 
by a similarly low level of housing quality. The equilibrium rental rate-high 
or low-is  none other than a fair one. The old saw, You  get what you pay for, 
holds even in regulated markets. 
In response to price controls, insurers likewise have an incentive to provide 
a product that is of lower quality and therefore cheaper to produce. They have 
less incentive to purchase reinsurance, even at fair prices, since much of the 
benefit of  that reinsurance  accrues to others (policyholders,  state-guarantee 
funds, other insurers, taxpayers, etc.). The result is that state-guarantee funds 
must bear considerably greater risks that a large catastrophe will become their 
responsibility  or the responsibility  of policyholders  and taxpayers. In short, 
everyone suffers if regulation  makes it unprofitable for insurers to provide 
high-quality insurance contracts. 
This explanation also fits the cyclic behavior of quantities. After a big event, 
insurers may feel that their underwriting prices are particularly low. Thus, even 
with reinsurance offered at a fair price, they will cut back more on reinsurance 
purchases. The major weakness of this explanation is that it cannot explain 
16. For the way  in which capital market innovations might help solve these problems (to the 
extent that they exist), see also the discussion below. 17  Introduction 
high prices. However, it does explain why insurers may perceive reinsurance 
prices as high, that is, as being in excess of what they can profitably afford 
to pay. 
Much as with rent control, there is a social policy issue here that will not 
be dispensed with so easily. What if, for example, the risk of  an earthquake 
occurring along an old fault line in a working-class town suddenly surges? 
Charging the actuarially justified rate on homeowner’s insurance would result 
in reduced insurance purchases. Housing values would be hit with high home- 
owner’s rates in addition to the hit from the initial earthquake risk. And what of 
the uninsured? What is the appropriate policy? Should the state or the federal 
government transfer taxpayer funds to subsidize insurance purchases? Should 
insurers be forced to bear the cost and spread the burden across all their policy- 
holders by either raising general homeowner’s rates or lowering the quality of 
their product? And, whatever the answer, how does it change if  the affected 
area is not a single town but all of California? 
Explanation 7: The Presence of Ex Post Third-Party Financing 
Ex post financing of catastrophes occurs when other parties step in to pre- 
vent losses from being financed by policyholders. Chief among these entities 
is, of  course, the U.S. government. As is well known, the government has a 
major role in funding disasters at both the state and the federal levels, through 
a  number  of  agencies and  through  both  the  executive  and  the  legislative 
branches. During the period  1977-93,  the average federal expenditure for di- 
saster assistance was $7.04 billion (in 1993 dollars; see Moss, chap. 8 in this 
volume). This is far greater than the average annual loss borne by reinsurers 
on U.S. catastrophe coverage. In some forms of disasters, notably floods, the 
federal government has effectively eliminated the incentive for the creation 
of private market insurance contracts. Indeed, before the federal government 
stepped in to provide disaster relief, private insurers did offer flood insurance 
(see Moss 1996). 
The federal government is not the only entity involved in ex post financing 
of catastrophes. State-guarantee funds and other insurers are often the next line 
of defense if an insurer is unable to meet its customer obligations. And, if the 
fund is exhausted, then in many cases solvent insurance companies are to make 
good on claims against insolvent companies. This creates two types of bad 
incentives. First, companies have an incentive to shift the burden onto the fund 
or other insurers before the fund is exhausted. Second, companies who do not 
act to shift high-layer losses onto the pool are themselves likely to have to pay 
for others. Well-behaved insurers will wish to avoid doing business in states 
with guarantee funds and pools. This is another way in which adverse selection 
can increase the cost of  insurance. Overall, the outcome is an incentive for 
insurers to enter a race to the bottom in customer credit quality (see Bohn and 
Hall, chap. 9 in this volume). This strengthens the need for regulation and can 
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From an economist’s perspective, such ex post financing should be viewed 
as a form of market failure. The federal government cannot credibly commit 
not to fund disasters after the fact: even if it says that it will not provide disaster 
relief ex ante, the political incentives to do so ex post are overwhelming. Given 
that this is the case, no one would have the incentive to buy a private-insurance 
contract at an actuarially fair price or  greater since the government effectively 
subsidizes losses through these programs. Of course, taxpayers will pay  for 
subsidized losses by some means. The government is unlikely to administer a 
disaster program and monitor disaster payments as well as a dedicated insurer 
would, so the size of  the loss (net of  processing costs) paid by  taxpayers is 
likely to be that much greater. Also, there is no mechanism to discipline risk- 
taking incentives: population growth in high-flood-risk zones is not moderated 
by charging risk takers for the expected losses that they impose on the system. 
How does ex post financing affect the price and quantity of  reinsurance? 
Clearly, insurers have less incentive to provide insurance in the presence of ex 
post financing. One way of doing this is by not underwriting risk in the first 
place. A second way is to shift the actuarial costs of the risks onto others. Since 
insurers must pay for reinsurance but may obtain ex post financing at lower 
(even zero) costs, they have an incentive to substitute away from reinsurance. 
As with explanation 6,  ex post financing cannot explain why prices might 
be high. It can, however, explain why insurers perceive reinsurance prices as 
high. It can also explain low quantities of high-layer reinsurance and the cyclic 
downturns in quantities after major events. 
Explanation 8: Behavioral Factors 
A commonly cited reason for the low quantity of high-layer reinsurance is 
that the perceived likelihood that reinsurance will pay is too low to matter. This 
issue about perception is ubiquitous in insurance markets. 
For economists who use a utility-based approach to understand behavior, 
insurance against severe but low-probability events is very valuable to consum- 
ers. Utility-type approaches argue that outcomes that lose twice as much are 
perceived by people as more than twice as bad. Yet, in contrast, people often 
do not insure against low-probability, severe outcome events. They often un- 
derpurchase insurance. They often do not take mitigation seriously, and, when 
they do, they require too high a return on mitigation expenditures (see Klein- 
dorfer and Kunreuther, chap. 4  in this volume). 
There are many potential reasons for this behavior. One is that people dis- 
count too heavily events that they cannot readily perceive. Famous  studies 
from the 1970s (e.g., Tamerin and Resnik 1972) show that the rate of smoking 
is higher among the general populace than among general practitioners, higher 
among general practitioners than among internists, and higher among inter- 
nists than among specialists who work directly with lung cancer patients. Even 
when the consequences and probabilities  of bad outcomes are well known, 19  Introduction 
the repeated hammering home of bad outcomes affects behavior (Diamond, 
comment on chap. 2 in this volume). 
A  second  behavioral  effect  is  that  individuals  often  seem  “ambiguity” 
averse. A lack of  clarity about the risks and events being insured may  lead 
insurers and reinsurers to set premiums high (see Kunreuther, Hogarth, and 
Meszaros  1993). Behaviorally, people distinguish  between  risk  and uncer- 
tainty. With risk, the probabilities of  different outcomes can be determined. 
Examples would be lotteries or card games. With uncertainty, however, the 
probabilities cannot be determined. What is the likelihood of an earthquake in 
Boston? How frequently is a well-built house on the Florida coast destroyed 
by wind? Uncertainty is inherently more ambiguous, and surveys suggest that 
individuals charge more to bear it. 
A related behavioral argument is that big events do not generate enough 
“job risk” for people in charge of buying insurance and reinsurance. Studies 
of  corporate insurance purchases, for example, tend to show that mid-layer 
risks are often insured more frequently than high-layer risks. The argument is 
that managers are off the hook if the event is large enough since many others 
will be in the same boat. For smaller events, insurance is easily available and 
purchased by  others, which reinforces the desire for a manager to purchase 
(re)insurance. It is worth noting that this argument is another form of agency 
cost-“job  risk” would not be an issue if  people were buying insurance on 
their own behalf. 
As under explanations 6 and 7, pricing may be fair under the behavioral 
hypothesis, but the quantity of risk transfer is nevertheless low. 
Moving Ahead: Changing the Distribution of Risk through Capital 
Markets, Deregulation, and Alternative Risk Transfer 
Many observers, practitioners, and academics have argued that bringing cat 
exposures directly to the capital market can help reduce reinsurance prices and 
increase risk transfer. Mechanisms include cat-linked bonds, swaps, exchange- 
traded options and futures, cat-linked issues of equity, etc. (see, e.g., Cummins, 
Lewis, and Phillips, chap. 3 in this volume). 
Clearly, the degree of success that the capital markets can hope to bring 
depends on one’s assessment of the explanations outlined above. If the problem 
is that catastrophe-risk-taking capital is insufficient (explanation  l), then the 
capital markets clearly represent a potential solution. Indeed, the $50-$100 
billion events discussed earlier are equal in size to a normal day’s fluctuation in 
the value of U.S.  equities. With US.  financial assets totaling over $12 trillion, a 
large catastrophic event represents only about fifty basis points of wealth. 
Similarly, if the problem is that the corporate form of today’s reinsurers is 
inefficient (explanation 3), capital market devices would seem to help. Cat 
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higher-layer cat risks would not be subject to the kinds of agency costs experi- 
enced by firms. Moreover, if the equity of these firms is costly because of its 
tendency to move up and down with the market, then these costs could also be 
eliminated by embedding the risk in a cat bond, which would be treated more 
as debt. 
Certainly, these investments would at first need to provide an average return 
in excess of US.  Treasury bills. Indeed, cat bonds were originally envisioned 
for the CEA reinsurance layer written by Berkshire Hathaway and were to be 
offered on terms not so different from the reinsurance. If  these prices are to 
decline, it is clear that considerable infrastructure must first be laid. Investor 
education about cat risks, for example, is an important externality and will take 
time to build. 
Another important piece of infrastructure is a means for standardizing risk. 
Simple  securitization of  existing reinsurance  contracts is unlikely  to lower 
costs or increase capacity. Reinsurance contracts have tailor-made features and 
cover company-specific  exposures; they are, therefore, informationally inten- 
sive as investments. It makes little sense for individual investors, or their insti- 
tutional investment agents, to analyze these instruments. Existing reinsurance 
conserves on analysis by concentrating the exposures in a few places. Clearly, 
if it is to be economical to spread cat risk more widely, more standardization 
will be required. 
Catastrophe indexes are one way to accomplish this. Indexes help avoid the 
redundant analysis of  distinct risks. They also help promote liquidity, which 
further lowers the cost of risk transfer. Furthermore, to the extent that moral 
hazard and adverse selection  (explanation 5) are sources of  high prices  and 
low quantities, indexes can help.  If insurers transfer risks that are linked to 
industrywide losses, they can reduce the problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection faced by investors. Individual insurers may have control over their 
own losses and know more about those losses than reinsurers.  However, they 
do not have control over, nor do they know more about, index outcomes. Thus, 
indexes can make risk transfer more efficient, regardless of whether it occurs 
through capital market devices or traditional reinsurers. Indeed, index-linked 
cat reinsurance is already gaining popularity as a way  of reducing reinsurer 
capital costs. 
Of course, the standardization of an index is, all else equal, a disadvantage 
from the perspective of the (re)insurance buyer. An insurer would like to pro- 
tect itself against its losses, not insurance-industry losses. Thus, a critical issue 
in index design is that the index be flexible enough to keep down the “basis” 
between insurer-specific and index risk. An effective index must provide good 
hedging tools for cat-risk cedents. 
Indeed, my own view is that existing indexes have not caught because they 
are poorly correlated with individual insurer losses, given a large event. Ex- 
isting indexes aggregate industry losses at the statewide level. Unfortunately, 
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considerably within a state. The right hedge ratio, therefore, varies consider- 
ably within the state. To see this, suppose that a company hedges on the basis 
of its 5 percent statewide market share and that a storm destroys a small portion 
of the state where the insurer’s market share happens to be 10 percent of the 
market. Only half the insurer’s losses will be covered by  the index. In short, 
statewide blocks are too large to yield low-basis risk. To serve as good insurer 
hedges, indexes will need to report industrywide losses for smaller geographic 
blocks (i.e., zip codes).” 
Much of this is now being tested as a new catastrophe exchange located in 
Bermuda has recently opened. The Bermuda Commodities Exchange (BCE), 
owned by AIG, Guy Carpenter, and Chase Manhattan, and involving the Chi- 
cago Board of Trade, will trade contracts based on a U.S. homeowner’s catas- 
trophe index developed by Guy Carpenter. The index aggregates losses at the 
zip-code level and can, therefore, match the exposure of certain insurer portfo- 
lios more precisely than statewide indexes can. 
Clearly, however, whether capital market devices can work will depend on 
which of the eight explanations outlined above for the paucity of risk transfer 
are telling. For example, if the problem is purely reinsurer market power, then 
innovations in financing will lower prices and increase quantities only if new 
entrants come along and make the market more competitive. On  the other 
hand, to the extent that market power is created by  high reinsurer costs of 
capital, capital market solutions could help reduce the adverse effects of mar- 
ket power. 
Lowering the costs of  risk transfer may provide savings, but it cannot di- 
rectly solve the problems that result from state regulation and insurance pricing 
(explanations 6 and 7). However, transparent pricing of catastrophe risks in the 
reinsurance market may have important benefits for the efficiency of regula- 
tion. The market pricing of electricity is forcing the rationalization of utilities 
across the United States. This process will result, not only in more efficient 
plants and equipment, but also in more rational pricing by  utilities and their 
public commissions. Customers will benefit by  having a transparent and ob- 
servable market energy price to which to tie ratepayer contracts and service. 
By analogy, reinsurer and insurer financing costs can be useful benchmarks for 
a regulatory review of  underwriting prices. However, pricing is only one of 
many regulatory hurdles that may prevent efficient distribution of catastrophe 
risk.I8 
Clearly, government regulation can facilitate or impede risk transfer outside 
17. For an analysis of how hedge performance is affected by geographic aggregation, see Major 
(chap. 10 in this volume). 
18. Another example of costly regulation is that  financial instruments linked to catastrophe 
losses can in  some cases be considered insurance contracts by  state insurance commissioners. 
Because only licensed insurers are allowed to write such contracts, financial instruments that trans- 
fer premiums to investors in return for catastrophic risk  bearing must seek exemptions and  ap- 
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traditional reinsurance channels. Regulation can also mandate reporting of loss 
and exposure information to authorities, thereby permitting easy aggregation. 
Much as with Fannie Mae, the government  can pursue “market-enhancing” 
policies designed to jump-start broader market exchange of these risks. 
Going forward, it is most likely that traditional  reinsurance contracts will 
continue as the preferred risk-transfer vehicle even if capital market and other 
alternative-risk-transfer  solutions take off. Insurers that are small andor have 
less well-diversified exposures are likely to continue placing their risks with 
reinsurers. Indeed, it may well be that reinsurers, not insurers, will be the direct 
beneficiaries of capital market products. These products will simply allow re- 
insurers to place their risks with investors in many forms other than those of 
standard equity. The almost inevitable result is that the reinsurer cost of capital 
will decline and specialized capacity increase. As a result, more insured assets 
will be insurable than ever before. This will make risk sharing in society better, 
with better risk sharing being the fundamental goal of an insurance system. 
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